LOST IDENTITIES! BUILDING AND DISMANTLING SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS IN ROMANIA

Patrick RUS

Research in Sociology, Faculty of Sociology and Social Work, Bucharest, Romania

Abstract: Social intelligence approach provides a useful theoretical framework for looking at various social intelligence processes within society that can be initiated and developed in two complementary ways: actor-initiated process from top down and emergence social processes from bottom up. One the one hand, one of the actors that can initiate this process is the state. In this case, state institutions are supporting and maintaining the emergence and development of social intelligence processes within society. On the other hand, various agents within society (i.e. citizens, private firms, NGOs, so on) are the product of social intelligence emergent processes through their interactions. By this position paper we propose a complementary social intelligence approach. Our focus is Romania, a small state that provides interesting historical examples of both social intelligence processes. Our study is in a great measure descriptive, but in the second and third part, it provides an explicative and predictive viewpoint by the social mechanisms identified. Thus, in the first part of the paper, we present our theoretical framework based on social intelligence approach and the idea of network approach. We argue that there is a co-determination relationship between the concepts, social intelligence viewed through the agency lens and network approach viewed as structure. In the second part of the paper, we provide two examples of social intelligence processes. As a state-initiated process we provide Haret-Gusti social intelligence networks approach and as an emergent social intelligence process we provide at the enterprise level, the examples of MICA COMPANY BRAD and MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK. In the third part of the paper, we investigate a social mechanism that act as a mediating process that play a key role in dismantling of social intelligence networks. In this sense, we provide two study cases by which we explain the dismantling of social intelligence emergent networks within society. These will underline the orientation risk toward future in building social intelligence resilient networks within society.

Keywords: actor-initiated social intelligence; emergent social intelligence processes; subversion; social mechanisms; security culture

1. INTRODUCTION

Social intelligence is an approach situated on a succession series from Marquis de Condorcet, John Dewey, Stevan Dedijer (Sebe, 2010). In France, Condorcet introduced his social instruction program in order to generate and diffuse knowledge within society. In 30s, John Dewey in USA supported that citizens must be engaged in public policy issues and they must be educated in this sense by universities (Dewey, 1930; Carpenter, 2006). Thus, he proposed the concept of social intelligence as a mechanism for preparing the citizens through learning processes within universities, as a continuous flow to secure the future generation of human capital (Sebe, 2010).

Dedijer (1978; 1982a; 1987; Dedijer and Svensson, 1994; 2002) defined social intelligence as the overall capability of a social system that anticipate, learn, manage and adapt to environment and environment rapid changes in order to assure its security and future development. According to Dedijer, social intelligence is proper to every social entity (i.e. citizens, corporations, NGOs, nation-states so on). Thus, Dedijer conceptualized social intelligence approach as agency-initiated process. In this process, the political elites within the state are responsible for initiating, supporting and developing social intelligence processes within society. He regarded also, multinationals as agents that initiate and develop social intelligence processes within the host nation (Dedijer, 1982b).

Dedijer observed that the most important economic sector in every society was gradually taken by knowledge industry. Its size, density and quality of information networks condition the social intelligence capability of that country (Dedijer and Jéquier, 1987). At the theoretical

level, we extend Dedijer's social intelligence approach viewed as agency, connecting it with the idea of network structure. Thus, we arrive at the agency-structure issue. We argue that social intelligence agency and network structure are co-determinate.

A complementary approach is that of emergent social intelligence processes. In this sense we use as reference framework the theory of emergence proposed by Epstein and Axtell (1996), that defined emergent structure as "stable macroscopic patterns arising from local interactions of agents" (Epstein and Axtell, 1996: 35). Thus, in their social interactions the agents (e.g. citizens, private firms, NGOs so on) can generate collective behavior of a certain complexity. In the social intelligence approach, agents are developing their capabilities based on knowledge accumulation processes generated and diffused to other agents through social interactions embedded in the network structure. The process of knowledge diffusion to other social agents clustered in social segments may generate the emergence of social intelligence processes, so far as, the network structure is not constraining the manifestation of them. Here is important to underline briefly, how agency and structure can constrain each other in the development processes of a small state, such as Romania, considering several social mechanisms.

Dedijer dedicated a long time to the study of less developed countries (LDCs) and particularly small states in their path to development based on social intelligence function. He stressed that social poverty, lack of education, corruption, ignorance are social mechanisms produced and reproduced that impede the developmental processes (Dedijer, 1982a). Moreover, small and less developed states that were subject to different historical negative social processes, such as communism experiment, that produced serious pathologies in their social structures and generated long-term social effects at multiple levels, have to transfer the research, innovation and culture from developed countries and to adapt them to their needs, qualities and vulnerabilities in order to catch-up and develop in an acceptable time interval. Romania is such a small state that was subject to a social experiment imposed through subversive processes by an external actor (i.e. USSR).

We propose the concept of social intelligence networks that allows us to conceptualize the social intelligence as agency and the idea of network viewed as structure. Thus, we extend the social intelligence approach proposed by Dedijer linked with network approach. The later approach represents both a knowledge and action tool, that has institutional utility, such as in the work of intelligence services, police systems to dismantle dark networks through different strategies (i.e. Duijn and Klerks, 2014). Its scientific roots are traced back to Moreno (1941).

This is a position paper by which we argue for a complementary social intelligence networks approach that can be initiated, supported and developed both: as actor-initiated process and as an emergent process.

2. STATE-INITIATED SOCIAL INTELLIGECE NETWORKS

2.1 Haret-Gusti Social Intelligence Approach. In Romania, Spiru Haret was the first who undertook a social intelligence approach to reform the social structure of society through social networks. As a model of reference, Haret took Nordic model, particularly Denmark villages, the most developed at European level in that period (Haret, 1905). Haret sent researchers to Denmark to study how they developed their villages. He understood that education was the vehicle to prepare and develop citizens' capabilities. His social intelligence approach was both top-down and bottom up. He identified the main agents of influence at national level. At the village level, the brokers were teachers and priests, that received the mission to inculcate locals with knowledge (Haret, 1905).

Moreover, he conceived a national network of researchers that needed to conduct field works in villages to identify population needs, qualities and vulnerabilities. He conceived focus groups as the main device to understand locals' needs and problems (Haret, 1905). Also, he identified social agents of influence such as: the prefect, the municipal inspector, mayor, notary, municipal council, village council so on (Haret, 1905). They were viewed as the brokers in their networks, that have knowledge about the local situation and resources to solve problems.

From top, the political elites were responsible with implementing public policies that minimize the social suffering and maximize the social welfare (Haret, 1910/1969: 191). He stressed the human security approach, that everyone has the right to a minimum level of welfare comprising: liberty, personal security, food, hygienic dwelling and clothing (Haret, 1910/1969: 191). Moreover, political elites must conceive a mass program of social instruction and diffuse knowledge throughout society, to achieve the integrated

civilization (Haret, 1910/1969: 186-191), that is systemic social intelligence. Haret suggested three components of social intelligence approach, that may be extended and sub-divided: economic, intellectual and moral (Haret, 1910/1969).

The first step to develop social intelligence networks was rising awareness levels of the importance of education. He operated through channels of contacts at highschool level (directors) and at regional level he contacted the prefects (Haret, 1905). They constituted contact brokers that were subject to influence in order to promote the importance of educational reform.

Among the most important social network in promoting educational reform was political elites. Haret built gradually a political network of influence through strong and weak ties in order to fulfill his mission. A key constraint was the political opponents that impeded the reforms and supported their obsolete traditional views. He fulfilled to extend his political network in order to influence other politicians from different parties who started to support his reform and, at the same time, Haret reduced the political influence of opposition cliques. Gaining access and support to different politicians who were willing to accept that reform was necessary was very difficult. The mechanism used in order to gain political influence was to target the main brokers in the social networks, influencers within their networks that have the power to inculcate ideas. The political network was extended at national level through communication channels as sending notices at regional and local levels in order to understand the situation, diffuse ideas and propose solutions.

Haret saw intelligence as Aristotle – human capability subject to continuous improvement (Haret, 1910/1969:156). He stated that if material and moral components are developed to an acceptable level, intelligence will become the most powerful force (Haret, 1910/1969:156-157). However, he suggested the necessity to find an equilibrium state between each component. Haret (1910/1969:157-158) distinguished between the medium intelligence and maximum intelligence. The medium intelligence represents the intellectual fond of society that determine the type and degree of development. The medium intelligence is influenced by the past social processes and its development depends on social innovation positive processes. Haret ([1910]/1969:158-186) considered also the negative social innovation processes and natural hazards that may impede the development of a social system.

Actor-generated social intelligence processes initiated, supported and developed have to be adapted exactly to the needs, qualities and vulnerabilities of a social system, in order to stimulate the latent social mechanisms accumulated through social learning processes that can accelerate change and the emergence of social intelligence processes from bottom up. The social intelligence networks were initiated from the state institutions at three levels: national, regional and local. Their dimensions were political, social, economic and knowledge. At the local level, it was conceived an interactive network between teachers, priests, locals and researchers.

Dimitrie Gusti continued the work of Haret and conceived a "science of nation" program (Gusti, 1937) that implied building social networks in order to generate social intelligence processes within society. Thus, he built a network of researchers as a knowledge tool and a political network as an action tool for implementing public policies. Gusti devised as devices teams of researchers to study villages and after that, he implemented social services institutes formed of young students, priests and teachers. Also, he considered building social networks through identification of persons that left the village, namely internal migration networks. Gusti approached holistically the social system through four components: health, education, work, psychology. His approach was that of knowledge-based action. Thus, Gusti has formed interactive social networks at local level, but the main limit was linking villages between each other generating social interactions between neighbor villages and larger networks at regional and finally at national level.

At the core of his social intelligence approach was the social mechanism of social learning for producing and diffusing information and knowledge throughout society. The academic realm was charged with knowledge generation processes through which human resources were produced. Likewise, it was interesting how Gusti viewed the interaction between technological innovation and social innovation for developing a science of nation, a project that today corresponds to social intelligence approach and civic intelligence approach (Schuler, 2010; 2016).

2.2 Emergent social intelligence networks: Mica Company Brad and Marmorosch Blank Bank. Building social intelligence networks in the realm of business is a process perpetuated from the ancient times. Among the most successful business

networks models of Romanian history were MICA COMPANY BRAD and MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK. They represented examples of building social intelligence networks within and without Romania, contributing to the reputation and image of Romania outside.

2.3.1 Mica Company Brad (1920-1948). From ancient times, gold was a resource that generated wealth, but also represented a curse for the people who mismanaged its utility. At the end of 18th century, in Romania was formed RUDA 12 APOSTLES ASSOCIATION, that was sold to a German mining company, HARKORTSCHEN BERGWERKE UND CHEMISCHE FABRIKEN ZU SCHWELM UND HARKORTEN A.G. ZU GOTHA in 1884. The German company has transformed the RUDA 12 APOSTLES into the most important mining exploitation of the entire Austro-Hungarian Empire and the entire central and southeast European area. In the interwar period RUDA 12 APOSTLES ASSOCIATION was sold to Leonhard Buchrucker of Brad, who handed over it to Adolf Sieber (Baron, 2006: 222-287). In 1931, under the name of MICA BRAD, the former RUDA 12 APOSTLES ASSOCIATION became a branch of the MICA COMPANY.

MICA COMPANY BRAD developed its social intelligence capability to procure, process, assess and disseminate knowledge throughout a social complex from Brad region, Transylvania. It was based on the basic resources: knowledge, secrecy and scientific research. Its social complex was formed by 44 villages that comprised 2800 workers (Societatea „MICA", 2012). MICA COMPANY developed a social doctrine, a program of action, a future-oriented vision and a security culture. Its action mechanisms were based on Gusti's integrated approach. MICA COMPANY extended its influence in the entire Golden Quadrilateral of Transylvania through economic and social networks. The Company used subversive processes to penetrate other companies and to impose its own people at the decision-making level and consequently its exploitation policies (Baron, 2006:63).

In order to manage threats such as gold theft, MICA COMPANY instituted a social instruction program and created a surveillance hierarchical network of individuals. The company created the social conditions and infrastructure for workers and their families in order to assure their security and development. They provided social security, food security, energetic security. Thus, they created a proper level of security culture.

Another important element in social intelligence capability was foreign technological transfer. MICA COMPANY continued to keep the supply networks from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and Germany. For example, the Company acquired from Germany, spare parts, tools, machinery and equipment from SIEMENS, KRUPP, HUMBOLDT DEUTZMOTOREN A.G. (Rișcuța, 2001-2002:643-644).

Also, the resilience of MICA COMPANY throughout the economic, social and political crisis is interesting to study. The Company absorbed the shocks of personnel turnover, financial volatility and external shocks such as, the Great Economic Crisis of 1929-1930, Second World War, the volatility of gold prices at global level, political instability, strikes of workers from trade unions so on. It is important to stress that MICA COMPANY contributed to many economic sectors, especially national defense. Today, MICA COMPANY BRAD represents a model for EURO SUN MINING COMPANY (former CARPATHIAN GOLD) that operates in Rovina Valley Project in Transylvania.

2.3.2 Marmorosch Blank Bank (1848-1948). MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK is another successful model of a social intelligence network that extended at global level. Jacob Marmorosch a trader that bought goods from Leipzig, London and Vienna markets, developed a contact network, especially with the famous JOSEPH MEYERS firm of London (Boambă, 1924). In 1863 he associated with a young man just returned from abroad studies, one of the first Romanian diplomats in the economic and financial sciences, Maurice Blank. In 1874, the bank become MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK. The new company was commissioned by LOBEL BANK from Vienna, the Austrian branch of an old Romanian bank operating under the same company in Galați (Boambă, 1924: 11). As Romanian economy started to develop, it required credit. The bank developed its social intelligence capability to anticipate the economic, political, social trends from the global security environment and managed to identify threats and opportunities for investment and influence in order to survive and grow.

The commercial banks have the widest contacts among all corporations (Browaldh, 1992: 53-58) and they need relevant and timely information for their operations. In the beginning of Independence War, the bank identified the opportunity and necessity to invest in military defense and to support the country interests. Also, the bank identified post-war investment

opportunities in railway strategic lines. Moreover, the bank identified potential investments in forestry industry, petroleum industry, food industry, cultural industry so on. In the cultural industry, Aristide Blank created in 1923 Publishing House "National Culture", endowed with state-of-the-art technology brought from Switzerland (Surcel, 2012). This organization was a tool for mediatic campaigns for supporting its economic interests. The bank supported actual and potential customers to export their products on external markets, advised investors on what industries and assets to invest.

Another opportunity detected by the bank was the rice husking industry, that was introduced in the country in 1904 (Boambă, 1924). It is interesting to see how the bank adapted to the security environment and how it managed the threats. The bank adapted continuously to the foreign policy of the country and built networks with the allied countries, such as Germany, Italy and Austria. In 1879, The bank formed foreign partnerships with the HUNGARIAN COMMERCIAL BANK (Lampe, 2017) and in 1899 the bank established relations with DARMSTADTER BANK and BERLINER HANDELS-GESELLSCHAFT. In 1906, the bank established its relations with the BANQUE DE PARIS ET DES PAYS-BAS, from France, that received two seats in the board of directors of the bank.

It is important to understand how the bank built its foreign networks in four countries: France, Austria, Turkey and USA, establishing branches and other external connections. In order to build international networks, the firms need contacts in the host countries such as ambassadors, academics, businessman, bankers. In 1918, Aristide Blank was sent by the Romanian government to mediate a trade deal in China (Suruianu, 2016).

In the postbellum period, the bank opened a branch in Paris, for the first time a bank with Romanian capital. In 1919, the bank opened a branch in Istanbul and in 1920, the bank established a branch in New-York. The Paris branch played an important role in marketing and image-building of Romania in attracting foreign capital (Boambă, 1924: 69). At the national level, the bank established networks based on strategic alliances in all the historical regions of the country, controlling around 100 firms. The initiator of Paris and New-York branches was Aristide Blank, who developed his contacts through his diplomatic and economic missions, being sent by the Romanian government. In 1931, MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK was the second bank that had the most participations in the Romanian economy. Within its internal structure, the Bank had a "marketing intelligence" department focused on market research, identifying the market changes and clients' preferences and needs. Another department was research department ("competitive intelligence department") preoccupied with environmental scanning and monitoring functions, identifying the threats and opportunities in the country and on external countries, preparing the decision support system for bank managers (Kirson, 2010:40-41).

2.3 Dismantling social intelligence networks.

"There is nothing more dangerous than [the feeling of] security" (Sir Francis Walsingham).

In this section we investigated the subversion mechanism that played a key role in the dismantling process of social intelligence networks. Understanding the disruptive social mechanisms implied in dismantling social intelligence networks such as, MICA COMPANY BRAD, that sustained about 30 years and MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK, that survived 100 years is of crucial relevance for today's intelligence services and police systems for a couple of points. Firstly, in understanding the subversive mechanisms of revisionist actors that try to undermine national security. Secondly, in the relation between intelligence services and policy-making, intelligence services must alert the decision-makers to take the proper decisions in order to prevent and manage threats and risks that could affect national security. Finally, in devising effective strategies in prevention and intervention to dismantle dark networks.

2.4 Subventing.
2.4.1 Subventing Mica Company Brad.
Subversion is a capability of a social system to influence through several mechanisms (i.e. economic control, agents of influence, propaganda, assassinations, organization of events so on) the sub-systems of another social system in order to control its future evolution. Subversion is interfering from within and it is a tool of any statecraft (Blackstone, 1964; Codevilla, 1992:355-386). In this paper, subversion is treated as a socio-economic mechanism used in a negative way by the agents of influence supported by an external revisionist actor (i.e. Nazi Germany, USSR).

The political changes after Second World War brought the rising power of communist ideology in Romania. USSR undertook subversive processes to

impose communism in Central and Eastern Europe implying long-term changes of the social structure (i.e. Honig and Yahel, 2017).

The Communist Party of Romania, supported by USSR started to penetrate the enterprises through its agents of influence who infiltrated in the trade unions and took over the control of business mechanism. Through trade unions, the agents of influence imposed their control on the production, goods and decision-making processes (Baron, 2006: 301). They have targeted the key nodes in the decision-making processes and removed the leaders and the personnel, created a network of agents for extending the gold theft that culminated with a decrease in production. These agents had extensive financial means and recruited accomplices among the workers and employees of the Company. They also managed to introduce people among the workers' representatives (Baron, 2006:306).

The network of agents used rumors as a mechanism in order to disseminate false information about low productivity, targeting the top management of MICA COMPANY BRAD in order to denigrate and affect their reputation (Baron, 2006:312). From 1947, the network of agents undertook radical measures and the structures were dismantled, following that, by the nationalization law of 1948, MICA COMPANY BRAD was abolished.

2.4.2 Subventing Marmorosch Blank Bank. With the emergence of negative ideologies in the interwar period, such as Fascism, Nazism and Communism, there was an unfriendly security environment for young democratic small states with a short tradition, as Romania. Moreover, the Great Depression from 1929-1930 generated great difficulties for enterprises worldwide. MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK was affected by two major factors: the economic crisis and Nazi ideological penetration using agents of influence against the top management of the bank, who supported a different political ideology and interests. Likewise, having in mind the ethnicity of the founder fathers of MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK it was susceptible that they will be targeted by legionaries. In the challenging context of economic crisis, the capacity of banks to project confidence in their investments was useless (Gavrilă, 2016). The bank was demanded by customers to refund their bank deposits. In October 1931, MARMOROSCH BLANK BANK became insolvent and bankrupt.

Despite the interventions from the National Bank of Romania (NBR took some of the debts and gave it the concession of tobacco and salt disposal) and King Charles II, the bank was not able to completely recover, but it survived. The depositors caused riots and the bank was forced to close its branches (Gavrilă, 2016). With the coming in power of the Antonescu regime, an unprecedented vengeance operation was triggered by all those who were perceived as close to King Charles II (Surcel, 2012). From 1927, Aristide Blank was involved in the power struggle at the top of the country and supported King Charles II to return to the throne. In this sense, through his Publishing House, initiated informational campaigns supporting King Charles II. From 1930, he became the economic counselor of the King Charles II.

At the beginning of 1940, Aristide Blank was the target of a missed, planted, legionary attack. The new political establishment wanted to liquidate the bank and accused Aristide Blank with distortion of balance sheets. The bank was forced to pay around 800 million lei to the state (Gavrilă, 2016). Until 1948 the bank payed all its debts by selling the properties and lands it owned, marketing products made of tobacco and salt, opening a new firm "DISCOM", that took over its obligations on behalf of the bank, paying a 14-year loan granted by the National Bank of Romania (Suruianu, 2016). However, the communist regime liquidated it, as MICA COMPANY and all private enterprises.

The main evidences indicate that negative ideological agents of influence opposed concurred for controlling the resources of the bank and revenge against perceived threats. The mechanisms used by legionnaires, supported by Nazi Germany were assassination attempt, instigation, denunciation so on. In subversive operations, the intelligence services of an external party are supporting the insiders (i.e. agents of influence) and operate to eliminate the opposition elements (i.e. Codevilla, 1992:355-386; Maguire, 2015; Honig and Yahel, 2017). In our investigation we found a connection between Aristide Blank and his assistant and businessman Constantin Bursan ("Doctor Bruno"), who was (high degree of probability) a double agent of the German Abwehr and Intelligence Service (Suruianu, 2016).

In the social networks analysis targeting authority individuals such as Aristide Blank is a strategy for disrupting networks. The legionnaires had a strategy, from which subversion was an essential tool. Their strategy was to remove the leaders, to breach the trust within bank and between its clients and whole network, thus

triggering internal and extern distrust with the aim to disintegrate and control the resources. These subversive mechanisms weakened state resilience and undermined the national security, culminating with larger subversion processes imposed by communism.

3. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we supported that (1) actor-initiated social intelligence networks and emergence social intelligence networks are complementary approaches and provide an integrated approach for initiating and developing social intelligence processes within society, an approach that goes hand in hand with developing and diffusing security culture; (2) there is a perennial strong relationship between social intelligence (agency) and network (structure) in the emergence and development of social intelligence networks; (3) subversion as a social mechanism has a key role in disrupting social intelligence networks.

The study cases investigated in this paper present a series of actual and relevant lessons for intelligence services and police systems. Firstly, understanding the overwhelming use of subversive mechanisms by revisionist state and non-state actors operating through agents of influence within society. The mechanisms used such as, targeting, influencing or removing decision makers, instilling distrust among employees within companies, spreading rumors that affected the reputation capital of leaders, agitation of workers, penetrating business mechanism and controlling the resources are only few examples of the multitude of mechanisms identified. Also, industrial subversion of large companies was part of a strategy to weaken state resilience.

Both companies investigated, contributed to many economic sectors of the state (especially, national defense) and had corporate social functions in society, producing and distributing welfare. Penetrating those companies and controlling their resources weakened economic capacity of the state, that is a pillar of national security. Secondly, the two models studied emphasize the need to develop social intelligence networks capabilities, both within and without company.

Learning these lessons of the past are very relevant and useful today, at the global level, when subversion is one of the key mechanisms of different revisionist states and terrorist networks, that is directed to weaken our democratic institutions and values, and consequently our security. Even more, looking at the future we must pay attention at the orientation risk and to integrate resilience thinking in building social intelligence networks within society.

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